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A Victory for Families, But Hardly a Panacea:
The Supreme Court Holds That the Family and Medical Leave Act Applies to
States
By JOANNA GROSSMAN
lawjlg@hofstra.edu


Tuesday, Jun. 03, 2003
Last week, in Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources, the Supreme Court handed down a decision upholding
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as constitutional when applied to states. Among other things, that
means that sufficiently large employers must grant twelve weeks of unpaid maternity and paternity leave.
The decision is important, and ironic, for several reasons. For one thing, surprisingly, it was a profederal power
decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist  who is much better known for upholding states' rights against the
exercise of federal power. For another thing, from a civil rights perspective, the decision may offer little tangible
benefit, and even take away more than it gives.
First, the practical import of the victory is likely to be small, for reasons I will explain below. Second, at the same
time that Rehnquist's majority opinion validates the FMLA's exercise of federal power, the decision cements the
Court's recent efforts to hamstring Congress in other ways.
For instance, the decision reiterates that Congress cannot define the substantive equality guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, it operates under the assumption that Congress cannot enact substantive
entitlements pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's conservative block had laid the groundwork for this in recent cases involving Eleventh Amendment
challenges to other federal civil rights statutes intended to apply to the states (which the Court did not ultimately
allow). Hibbs gave Justice Rehnquist the opportunity to reinforce and apply that precedent while, at the same
time, appearing to promote civil rights.
Thus, while approving this relatively narrow civil rights law, the Court preserved its ability to strike down other,
broader acts, at least to the extent they are applied to the states.
The FMLA, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Supreme Court's Bottom Line
The FMLA  a federal statute enacted in 1993  requires employers with more than 50 employees to give
employees twelve weeks of unpaid leave when that leave is necessitated by an employee's serious illness, by birth
or adoption of a child, or by the serious illness of a close family member.
At the end of the leave period, the employee must be reinstated. If the employer does not comply, the employee
may be able to sue for damages. Thus, in the Hibbs case itself, William Hibbs invoked the FMLA to sue his
employer  the State of Nevada  for allegedly refusing to reinstate him after he took time off to care for his sick
wife.
The State of Nevada argued that the Eleventh Amendment meant Hibbs's suit had to be dismissed. That
Amendment prohibits Congress from making states amenable to suits for money damages, unless it both has the
power to abrogate their sovereign immunity, and clearly does so.
"Sovereign immunity" is a concept imported to America from English law, in which the King could not be sued. In
the U.S., however, the "sovereigns" are the People, and the question is whether the governments that represent
them can be sued. The Court has held that sovereign immunity is the default rule  meaning that states have it
until Congress can and does take it away.
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/grossman/20030603.html
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In Hibbs, the Court said that Congress could, and did. That is, it held that, when it came to the FMLA, Congress
both had the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity and unmistakably did so. Now that these issues have
been resolved in Hibbs's favor, the case can proceed forward in the court below.
The Basis Congress Claimed For Abrogating Sovereign Immunity
It was quite obvious, in the Hibbs case, that Congress was unmistakably trying to take away states' sovereign
immunity with respect to FMLA claims and to allow them to be sued. After all, a provision of the FMLA states
specifically that states and their subdivisions are bound by it.
That left only one question: Did Congress have the power to do what it was trying to do? To determine that
answer to this question, in accord with its prior precedents, the Court looked to the Constitutional provision that
was the source for Congress's power to enact the FMLA.
In this case, it didn't have to look far. The legislative history of the FMLA contains plain statements that Congress
was drawing on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as its power under the
Commerce Clause.
Section 5 authorizes Congress to "enforce" the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection with "appropriate
legislation." This provision, the Court has held in the past, gives Congress the authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity, provided it exercises that power in an appropriate way. (In contrast, the Court has refused
to allow Congress to abrogate immunity when it acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause.)
The Court's Holding that Congress Was, Indeed, Exercising Section 5 Power
That leads to another question: Congress said it was acting under Section 5, but was its action valid?
The Court has said that Section 5 allows Congress to enact statutes prohibiting unconstitutional behavior by the
states. But in this case, the Constitution did not guarantee twelve weeks' leave in particular, as the FMLA does, so
simply denying that period of leave was not inherently unconstitutional. In addition, it might not be
unconstitutional for a workplace to give greater maternity leave than paternity leave, since mothers are still
recovering from pregnancy, and fathers, obviously, are not. But the FMLA gives both sexes twelve weeks equally.
Fortunately for Hibbs, however, the Court had also said that Section 5 empowers Congress to enact statutes that
prohibit constitutional behavior  such as, here, denying twelve weeks of leave  to the extent necessary to
prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.
To do so, however, Congress must both act based on a history of constitutional violations, and design a remedy
that is both proportional and congruent to the identified injury. Put simply, Congress must be acting to remedy
actual, past constitutional violations by the states.
In Hibbs, the Court both found the required constitutional violations, and approved Congress's remedy for them.
Specifically, the Hibbs opinion found that states had long committed acts of sex discrimination against female
employees, often based on the "pervasive sexrole stereotype that caring for family members is women's work."
In addition, it found that the FMLA was enacted to promote sex equality by responding to that discrimination.
A History of Sex Discrimination When It Comes to Working Women
The Supreme Court's solicitude, in Hibbs, for Congress' findings regarding the history of statesponsored sex
discrimination is heartening. As the Court recognized, there was copious evidence to support these findings.
For the better part of the Twentieth Century, states enacted and maintained laws designed to limit the rights of
working women. Illinois refused to permit women to act as lawyers. Michigan refused to allow women to tend bar.
Oregon limited the number of hours women could do wageearning work. Florida encouraged women to avoid jury
service on the theory that it would interfere with their duties as mothers.
Repeatedly, when women tried to seek relief from the U.S. Supreme Court, it turned them away  making the
Court's own recognition of this discrimination all the more significant as an implicit repudiation of past Court
mistakes.
Even today, Congress found evidence that states continue to rely on outmoded gender stereotypes in the
workplace. And these stereotypes were particularly strong with respect to the administration of caregiving and
parental leave.
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/grossman/20030603.html
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States, the record showed, like private sector employers, tend to offer maternity leave but not paternity leave. Or
even worse, they offered no leave at all.
Either way, they furthered the stereotype of women as primary responsible for family caregiving needs, parental
or otherwise. Denying paternity leave but allowing maternity leave (beyond any actual period of disability
associated with childbirth) assumes that men are not interested in child care, and places the whole burden on
women. Meanwhile, offering no leave at all tends to force women to quit in order to become full or parttime
caretakers. In either case, women become less attractive to employers because they are likely to cost more, and
stay for less time.
Currently, the Supreme Court applies a "heightened scrutiny" standard for genderbased classifications. Under
that standard, these stateenacted laws and stateadministered policies, like their predecessors from earlier in the
century, would be struck down as violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, this evidence solidly established a history (past and present) of unconstitutional, discriminatory
policies. This was the history that Congress relied on in enacting the FMLA. Given this history, and the limited
scope of Congress' response to it, the Court concluded that the FMLAas a remedy for constitutional injurywas
both congruent and proportional.
The FMLA entitles both mothers and fathers to leave for caregiving, on the same terms. In so doing, it should
eliminate any disincentive for employers to hire women. In addition, it should encourage fathers to become more
involved in caregiving. More broadly, through these measures, the FMLA seeks to promote equality between
women and men as workers, and between women and men as parents.
By equalizing leave for both sexes, the Court said, it "attacks the formerly statesanctioned stereotype that only
women are responsible for family caregiving." In addition, it targets the "fault line between work and family,"
where "sexbased generalization has been and remains strongest."
The FMLA's Reality: Men Don't Take Leave
While it is a victory for sex equality that the FMLA was upheld, it is a relatively small victory, in practical terms, for
the FMLA is limited in several ways.
First, the FMLA's 50employee threshold excludes almost half of the American workforce. Second, the FMLA
guarantees only unpaid leave, which most workers cannot afford to take. The same workers who cannot afford to
hire a caregiver, also cannot afford to take unpaid leave: For them, quitting may still seem like the only option.
But what about those employees who do work for big companies, and can afford to take leave  such as women
executives striving both to break "glass ceilings" and to have children too? Isn't the FMLA great for them?
No. Unfortunately, the FMLA also often leaves such women out in the cold, for it expressly excludes highranking
employees and officers. So it won't be breaking any glass ceilings any time soon.
Meanwhile, in reality, men, by and large, don't take FMLA leave  or any other type of leave  for purposes of
caring for a child or sick family member. And that means the FMLA can't really accomplish its honorable goals. The
idea of the FMLA is that when men and women both are allowed to take equal caretaking leaves, they will remain
equally (un)attractive as employees, and equally likely to be caregivers.
Why don't men take leave? The answer is cultural and financial. Men often make more than their female partners
 a reality that itself is largely the product of sex discrimination. As a result, taking unpaid leave costs them more.
Meanwhile, traditionally, men have not been involved in caregiving. They feel pressure, reinforced by widely held
sex stereotypes, both to maximize their career opportunities and dissociate themselves from familycentered work.
In addition, they fear retaliation from employers for availing themselves of leave offered. Women often have little
choice but to take at least some maternity leave and their doing so fits sex stereotypes. In contrast, men can opt
not to take paternity leave, and they defy sex stereotypes by taking it. Men thus reasonably may have a greater
fear than women that their employer may hold their taking leave against them, or simply be less accustomed to
experiencing consequences at work flowing from parenthood.
These disincentives appear powerful. The numbers are so starkalmost no men take leave, even if it is available,
and those that do average a leave of 5 daysthat Professor Mike Selmi has even suggested that the FMLA ought
to be amended to make leave mandatory for both men and women.
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Alternatively, other reforms  such as subsidizing FMLA leave through unemployment insurance  might induce
higherearning men to take leave. In addition, such reforms may also enable more women to take advantage of
the leave period despite financial constraints.
The FMLA's goals are laudable. But for real advances in sex equality, we need to look beyond the FMLA. Despite
the FMLA, caregiving responsibilities still rest predominantly with women, largely as a result of past and current
sex discrimination and stereotypes.
Truly effective legislation will actually redistribute those responsibilities more equally, as the FMLA, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, has not. (At most, it has made it easier for women to bear the same burdens.)
Only when such legislation is enacted, will women stand a chance at achieving equal status as wageearners.
Joanna Grossman, a FindLaw columnist, is an associate professor of law at Hofstra University. Her other columns, including columns on sex
and pregnancy discrimination, may be found in the archive of her columns on this site.
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